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Abstract 
Does Thomistic Natural Law theory commit the naturalistic fallacy?  Ralph McInerny 
seems to think that Thomistic Natural Law, as Thomas Aquinas himself articulates it, 
escapes any potentially defeating criticism derived from the Naturalistic fallacy as 
described most notably by G. E. Moore and David Hume, which states that morality is 
not derivable from any natural property.  The naturalistic fallacy, if successful in its 
purpose, deals a fatal blow to the school of moral philosophy that strives to adhere to 
traditional Thomism.  In response to the criticism rooted in the Naturalistic fallacy, 
scholars like John Finnis insist that Thomistic Natural Law must, at the very least, 
undergo a re-articulation to answer this challenge.  Their theory, new Natural Law 
Theory, subtly, but significantly departs from Thomism by replacing the telos with a 
deontological ethic.  Thomistic Natural Law, traditionally understood, has much to offer 
contemporary philosophy in its own right—independent of newer, similar theories, and 
does not need any major revision to answer the challenge posed by either version of the 
naturalistic fallacy.  
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The Thomistic Conception of Natural Law:  
Does It Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy? 
 
In the history of Western civilization the concept of Natural Law has permeated 
the writings of political scientists and philosophers alike.  Natural Law theory as 
conceptualized by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) most accurately accounts for the manner 
in which man moralizes and in turn formulates positive law, by insisting that ethics are 
necessary for the formation of a legal system.1  Natural Law as understood by Classical 
Realism is intuitive and universal—everyone everywhere recognizes it.  Thomas Aquinas 
asserted that Natural Law is accessible to everyone through the exercise of human reason.  
He also understood positive law as a manifestation of the Natural Law which itself 
extends from the nature of God; it is imprinted onto the ordered structure of the cosmos 
and accessible to rational man either through introspection or through observation of the 
order, logic, and morality of the universe.  As a rational creature, man is capable of 
ascertaining what constitutes an ethical way of life.  Aquinas argues that, since human 
beings are by nature rational beings, it is morally appropriate that they should behave in a 
way that conforms to their rational nature. 2  From this Aquinas derives his concept of 
moral law as formulated from the nature of human beings.3 
One of the most challenging criticisms leveled at Natural Law theory as a whole, 
and ostensibly most devastating to Thomistic Natural Law theory, the naturalistic fallacy 
                                                 
1
 John Finnis. Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Founders of Modern Political and 
Social Thought). (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 3.  
2
 Frederick C. Copleston, Aquinas, Pelican philosophy series. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1955), 223. 
3
 Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law: [being Summa 
Theologiae, I-II; QQ. 90 through 97], trans. R J. Henle (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1993), 160.  
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as formulated by G. E. Moore in his seminal book, Principia Ethica.4  Moore’s 
naturalistic fallacy is closely related, but not identical to David Hume’s earlier 
formulation.  Scholarly use of the locution “naturalistic fallacy” often fails to convey 
clearly a univocal meaning.  The phrase can refer to either a theory proposed by Hume 
(also denoted as the Is-Ought Problem), or a related (but not identical) one presented by 
G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica.  Conventional scholarly usage, such as that of Antony 
Flew’s also seems to allow for the conflation of the Humean and Moorean versions.5 
Clarification of Terms 
The confusion created by the indeterminate meaning of “naturalistic fallacy” 
requires clarification.  When critics of Natural Law theory accuse Aquinas of committing 
the naturalistic fallacy it is difficult to determine which fallacy or what combination of 
fallacies is referenced.  In this thesis, a special effort will be made to elucidate the 
meaning of an author’s reference to the naturalistic fallacy.  Moore’s version will be 
referred to as the Definist fallacy, and Hume’s as the Is-Ought Problem.  
Both the Humean version and Moore’s Definist fallacy served as catalysts, 
prompting John Finnis and Germaine Grizes, to rehabilitate Thomistic Natural Law 
theory by creating the New Natural Law theory.6  Other more traditional Thomists like 
Russell Hittinger, Alasdair MacIntyre, Ralph McInerny, Henry Veach, and Anthony 
Lisska attempt to counter the criticisms of Hume, Moore, or both to maintain the validity 
and relevance of Thomistic Natural theory.  Both the New Natural Law theorists and the 
more traditional Thomists agree that contemporary philosophy has, as a general rule, too 
                                                 
4
 G. E. Moore, and G. Scott Davis, Principia Ethica. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005), 
43-44. 
5
 Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 240-41.  
6
 Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and the Ethics of Tradition” in Natural Law Theory, ed. Robert P. 
George (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7.   
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hastily dismissed Thomistic Natural Law theory for other theories of Natural Law, or 
even legal positivism.   
Different Natural Law Solutions 
The more traditional Thomists disagree with Finnis and the New Natural Law 
theorists regarding how Aquinas’s Treatise on Law ought to be interpreted.  The New 
Natural Law theorists insist that either one or both of the articulations of the naturalistic 
fallacy are devastating for Thomistic Natural Law (traditionally understood).  The more 
traditional Thomists adamantly adhere to the traditional understanding of Thomistic 
Natural Law theory.  Both schools of thought insist that their interpretation most 
faithfully translates Thomistic Natural Law Theory into an analytic or contemporary 
philosophical context.  
Thomistic Moral Theory 
Thomas Aquinas merged what he considered to be the best element of Stoic 
ethics, namely their conception of the cosmic logos—the guiding, logical, natural order in 
the world—with the Aristotelian notion of the final telos or purposeful end of every 
object.7  He thought that a theory of Natural Law which combined these two elements, 
could most accurately account for both the natural state of man and the rational ethic man 
ought to follow.8  In other words the Thomistic ethic is both eudaimonistic and 
teleological.9   
 
 
                                                 
7
 A G. Sertillanges, The Intellectual Life: Its Spirit, Conditions, Methods, A Newman paperback 
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 23. 
8
 Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 5 ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 2005), 45-46. 
9
 Frederick Copleston, Medieval Philosophy From Augustine to Duns Scotus, New edition ed., vol. 
2 of A History of Philosophy (New York: Image, 1993), 398. 
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The Overlap Thesis 
Natural Law theory accepts that law can be spoken of in both a factual sense of 
actual social power and practice and as a set of ethical reasons for an action.  Legal 
positivism as a Natural Law theory criticizes what it perceives as an unfounded synthesis 
of two distinct understandings of Natural Law—descriptive and ethical.  Natural Law 
theorists attempt to incorporate both of these into one cohesive system.  So within this 
basic understanding of Natural Law there is an important distinction to make between 
two theories: Natural Law moral theory and Natural Law legal theory.  Thomas Aquinas 
argues that the discussion and study of Natural Law theory belongs simultaneously in two 
areas of philosophy, advocating an overlapping system that bases positive law on the 
foundation of ethics. 
The Summum Bonum 
 One of the most important phrases in the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is 
in this famous dictum.  “[B]onum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum 
vitandum.”10  That is, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.”11  A proper 
understanding of what Thomas means by the term “good” provides the key to discovering 
how Thomistic moral philosophy ought to be understood.  The Summum Bonum, the 
Highest Good, God Himself, informs all of Thomistic thought.  If human happiness 
consists in theoria, in contemplation of the “highest and noblest object,” then happiness 
lies intrinsically in contemplating God, Himself.12  Goodness, for Thomas Aquinas has its 
locus in the very nature of God.   
                                                 
10
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Corpus Thomisticum, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2094.html (accessed February 1, 2011). I-II 94.2 Respondeo 
11
 Translation my own.  
12
 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy From Augustine to Duns Scotus, 398. 
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Though this might seem too explicitly religious a basis for an ethical (and by 
extension) Natural Law theory, one must keep in mind that God as the Summum Bonum 
is the focal point for all of Aquinas’s writings.  Any attempt to interpret the vast body of 
his work apart from an awareness of the most essential scaffolding upon which he forms 
and hangs his complex philosophy, does him a great disservice.  A thorough 
understanding of Thomistic moral theology and by extension Natural Law depends first 
upon a fair and accurate understanding of what Thomas Aquinas taught and wrote.  
Further criticism of fundamental Thomistic assertions remains within the realm of 
external retrospection, and as such extraneous to the present concern of understanding 
Thomistic philosophy on its own. 
Thomistic Vocabulary 
The section of the Treatise on Law that most pertains to the question at hand is 
Question 94: “Concerning the Natural Law.”  In the first Article of this question Aquinas 
describes the teleology that provides the basis for his Natural Law system, while also 
elucidating the manner by which the intellect comes to recognize Natural Law.  This 
Question will provide the majority of material for exegesis:  
For it is said, that everything to which a man is inclined by his nature 
pertains to the Natural Law.  Now, each thing is inclined naturally to an 
operation which is suitable to it in accord with its form, thus fire is 
inclined to give heat.  For this reason, since the rational soul is the proper 
form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according 
to reason…. Therefore this is the first precept of the law; that which is 
good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.  Upon this principle all 
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other precepts of the law are based: so all the things that Practical 
Reason apprehends as man’s good, pertains to the precepts of Natural 
Law.13 
This excerpt from the Summa Theologiae is drawn from perhaps the most 
important passage in the Treatise of Law and provides the context for discerning the 
proper interpretation of Aquinas’s Natural Law theory.  Any attempt to evaluate 
Thomistic Natural Law requires a careful placement of this Natural Law theory in the 
greater context of Thomistic moral philosophy.14  The entire body of Aquinas’s moral 
thought provides the necessary foundation for any exegetical insights into the Treatise on 
Law.   
Speculative and Practical Reason 
All men have the same, basic rational capacities, so it would seem that the Natural 
Law would manifest itself in the same manner to everyone.  Aquinas argues in Question 
94, Article 4 that the Natural Law is universally accessible to everyone.  He uses his 
careful distinction between speculative and practical reason as his means for elaborating 
how the Natural Law can at once be universally the same, and express itself differently in 
particular situations.15   
Speculative reason is engaged with “necessary things, which cannot be 
otherwise.” 16 Practical reason, however is preoccupied with contingent matters, and 
“therefore, though there is some necessity in the universal principles, the more we 
                                                 
13This translation is my own. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Corpus Thomisticum, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2094.html (accessed February 1, 2011). Treatise on Law Q 94.) 
14
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Law Series) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1980), 398. 
15
 Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 260. 
16
 Ibid, 261. 
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descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.”17  In matters of 
action, which Natural Law encompasses, “Truth and or practical rectitude is not the same 
for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to general principles....”18  Neither is “truth or 
rectitude” the same for all nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.19   
Speculative reason concerns itself with obtaining knowledge to understand and 
explain reality, in the manner of syllogisms, definitions, and judgments.  The first 
principles of speculative reason are self-evident, indemonstrable principles (i.e. “Being 
is;” the law of non-contradiction).  Practical reason governs knowledge which pertains to 
action, and carrying out the “good” requires the cooperation of the will, and begins with 
the end, the telos.  The first principles of practical reason are analogous to the first 
principles of speculative reason.  So the speculative principle: “something cannot both 
exist and not exist in the same place in the same way” is analogous to the synderesis rule, 
“good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.”20 
Aquinas offers an example of a situation where a general principle seems to be 
contradicted.  He refers to the general principle that anything that is borrowed should be 
returned to its original owner.  “This is true for the majority of cases: it may happen, 
however, in a particular case that it would be harmful, and therefore, unreasonable, to 
restore goods held in trust.”21  He then provides a specific instance in which it would be 
wrong to restore borrowed property to its original owner: “For instance if they are 
claimed for the purpose for fighting against one's country.”22  The Natural Law, then, can 
                                                 
17
 Ibid, 260-261. 
18
 Ibid, 261. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid, 248. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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manifest itself rather differently in particular circumstances.  Therefore, particular 
differences merely suggest that as one is further removed from the basic principles 
legitimate differences in opinion emerge, and emerge with greater frequency. 
Aquinas asks Question 94, Article 5: “Whether the Law of Nature Can Be 
Changed?”23  He answers that “with regard to the first principles of Natural Law, the 
Natural Law is altogether unchangeable,” yet regarding the “secondary principles” or 
particular circumstances, the Natural Law remains unchanged, but can manifest itself in 
different ways.24  In addition, Natural Law may be augmented “for the benefit of human 
life” and is supplemented “both by the Divine law and by human laws.”25  In other words, 
the Natural Law can be supplemented as far as dictating the proper course of action for a 
particular case, but this does not entail a “change” of the law. 
Aquinas is forced, however, to explain some difficult events in Scripture, as when 
God commanded Abraham to slay Isaac or the prophet Hosea to take a “wife of 
fornication.”26  Or even more problematically, the genocidal decrees God makes to the 
Israelites.  How does Aquinas explain?  “By the command of God, death can be imposed 
on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatsoever.”27  Nevertheless, 
Aquinas is not asserting that these exceptional cases are not additions to the Natural Law, 
but that as additions they do not change the law. 
Precepts 
Aquinas asserts that Natural Law has basic, guiding precepts by which the Natural 
Law is discovered by the human intellect.  In other words, just as certain “principles” of 
                                                 
23
 Ibid, 268.  
24
 Ibid, 269 
25
 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. I-II Q. 94. A. 5. 
26
 Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 268. 
27
 Ibid, 269. 
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speculative reason exist similar to the law of non-contradiction, in the same way 
principles of Natural Law exist.  These principles are self-evident, in one of two ways: 
either they are “self-evident in themselves” or they are “self-evident to different 
people.”28  The three most basic principles of Natural Law are as follows: 
I. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.29 
II. The procreation and the education of offspring ought to be pursued.30 
III. Humans goods are those goods to which humans have natural inclinations (i.e. 
to “know the truth about God” and the achievement of societal harmony).31 
Different Kinds of Law 
Aquinas distinguishes between four different types of law which necessitate his 
use of the word “law” analogously between the distinct definitions.32  Many of the 
misunderstandings of his theory originate from an improper characterization of his use of 
the word “law” as univocal rather than analogical.  The strength of Thomistic Natural 
Law theory lies in the careful distinctions between Eternal Law, Natural Law, Human 
Law, and Divine Law. 
Eternal Law 
The first type of law that Aquinas addresses is eternal law.  Eternal Law is the 
ideal order and design of the universe in the mind of God—“The very Idea of the 
government of things in God the Ruler of the universe.”33  There are two sides to this 
Thomistic conception of eternal law.  In one sense this law is transcendent, utterly 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, 245. 
29Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. I-II Q. 94. A. 2.  
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Aquinas, trans. R J. Henle Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law, 149. 
33
 Ibid, 154. 
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ineffable and integrated within the mysterious divine nature.  In another sense Eternal 
Law is immanent and accessible as it permeates the entire universe—it is the basic, 
orderly structure of the cosmos. 
Natural Law 
The second type of law, Natural Law, is observed in the human inclination to do 
good and avoid evil.  “It is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in 
so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them....Wherefore [human nature] has a 
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: 
and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the Natural 
Law.”34  Natural Law enables humans to participate in the Eternal law—it is the 
universal, human, moral impulse. 
Human Law 
The third type of law that Thomas Aquinas introduces is Human Law.  Human 
Law is essentially temporal law, or positive law—the application of Natural Law to legal 
systems.  Human Law is man-made and created by governments for the practical 
organization and regulation of society.  Traffic laws and courtroom regulations are 
examples of Human Law.  Aquinas argues that there is no Human Law in an ontological 
sense—Human Law is a convention.  However for conventional or positive law to be 
just, it must be in agreement with Natural Law by logical extension and reflection. 
Divine Law 
The fourth type of law that Thomas Aquinas introduces is Divine Law, whose 
jurisdiction specifically and exclusively entails special revelation.35  Divine Law includes 
                                                 
34
 Ibid, 159-160. 
35
 Ibid, 166-167. 
THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW                                                                                      14 
 
those laws only accessible to men through Scriptures or Church Tradition, and consists of 
a unique set of specific and direct divine commands.  Divine Law is specifically needed 
for four reasons:  
I. Man’s final and last end, his telos transcends the mere natural;36  
II. There is a need in any ethical system for dependable and accurate moral 
principles;37 
III. God alone has the ability to judge one’s internal disposition and motive.38 
IV. “Human Law cannot punish or forbid all evils.”39  
Interaction Among the Different Laws 
In the Thomistic conception of these four laws, divine commands will always be 
perfectly consistent with God’s nature which is revealed in the cosmos.  The distinctions 
and analogies that Aquinas offers between the four different types of law provide the 
form and structure for his Natural Law theory.  Natural Law functions as one aspect of 
Aquinas’s conception of law.  Thomistic Natural Law has to be understood within the 
context of the greater system of which it is a small, but important part. 
Criticisms of Natural Law Theory 
 One of the most challenging criticisms leveled at Natural Law theory as a whole, 
and Thomistic Natural Law theory in particular, is the naturalistic fallacy as formulated 
by G. E. Moore in his seminal book, Principia Ethica.40  Though chronologically later 
than Hume’s Is-Ought Problem, Moore’s Definist Fallacy, could arguably function as the 
more general fallacy of which the Is-Ought Problem is a specific instance.  Hume’s 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, 171. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Moore, and ed. G. Scott Davis. Principia Ethica, 43-44. 
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iteration lodges a logical criticism against Natural Law theories, whereas Moore 
constructs a strictly analytic, linguistic problem for Natural Law theorists.  
David Hume’s Is-Ought Problem 
David Hume describes the Is-Ought problem as a type of criticism against any 
Naturalistic ethic.41  He illustrates what he sees as a logical fallacy inherent to it.  He 
asserts that nearly all of the preceding Naturalist ethicists have illicitly derived 
prescriptive statements from descriptive statements. 
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.  For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time 
that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it.42   
Latent in this excerpt from Hume’s, A Treatise on Human Nature, is his assertion 
that it is illogical to derive an “ought” from an “is,” a prescription from a description, a 
                                                 
41
 The author uses the term “Naturalistic” to mean that Cognitivist, meta-ethical category, which 
asserts that the “good” is derivable in at least some sense from natural properties. 
42
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford Philosophical Texts) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1740), 178. 
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moral value from a fact.  A simple, logical illustration will serve to elucidate Hume’s 
meta-ethical point: 
(1) a. Maria is in need of a 1300 on her GRE in order to get into her graduate 
school of choice. 
(2) a. Maria can get a 1300 on her GRE if she cheats. 
Hume asks: Can we logically infer the following conclusion? 
(3) a. Maria ought to cheat on her GRE.43 
Or, more simply: 
(1) b. Factual premise 
(2) b. Factual premise 
(3) b. Prescriptive conclusion 
Hume insists that both these arguments are invalid as neither conclusion (3)a nor 
conclusion (3)b can be logically inferred from premises (1)a and (1)b  and (2)a and (2)b, 
respectively.  According to Hume, the reason that conclusion (3) is illicitly derived from 
premises (1) and (2) is because this argument moves from a descriptive premise to a 
prescriptive conclusion without a major prescriptive premise.  Thus far Hume’s point 
seems perfectly legitimate—he is merely stating a logical rule of inference.  His essential 
criticism focuses upon a lack of clarity in the philosophical writings he encountered.  If 
Hume’s Is-Ought Problem is merely a logical one wherein a premise is absent from an 
argument, then Hume’s Is-Ought Problem allows for a fairly easy loophole for the 
                                                 
43
 This paradigm for this illustrative argument is drawn from: (Pojman, Louis P. Ethics: 
Discovering Right and Wrong. 5 ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005. pg. 209).   
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Natural Law theorist.44  The only step necessary to resolve the logical problem Hume 
presents, is to insert a major premise into the argument he criticizes.  
(1) Maria is in need of a 1300 on her GRE in order to get into her graduate school 
of choice. 
(2) Maria can get a 1300 on the GRE if she cheats. 
(3) Anyone who needs a 1300 on their GRE ought to cheat.  
Therefore, 
(4) Maria ought to cheat on her GRE.45 
Hume criticizes any type of Naturalism which derives an “ought” from an “is.”  
The appropriate response to this criticism, as demonstrated syllogistically, is merely to 
assert that there is an implied “oughtness” in many factual statements.  A simple insertion 
of a prescriptive premise corrects the form and clarifies the meaning of the argument.  
Prominent, contemporary Thomist, Ralph McInerny, in response to Hume, merely asserts 
that there is value in the universe, and that factual information in many cases entails 
evaluative information.46  In addition, prominent Virtue Ethicist and Aristotelian Philippa 
Foot, seems to think that Hume is simply wrong when he asserts that factual statements 
are utterly distinct from evaluative statements.47  Aquinas would respond similarly.  He 
would assert that the teleological nature of humanity and all of creation in itself, 
                                                 
44
 “Naturalist” in the sense of the ethical school under the umbrella of the Cognitivists, and in 
direct contrast to Non-Naturalism.  
45
 This paradigm for this illustrative argument is drawn from: Pojman, Louis P. Ethics: 
Discovering Right and Wrong. 5 ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005. pg. 212. 
46
 Ralph M. McInerny. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas Aquinas. 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 48. 
47
 Philippa Foot Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1981), 70.      
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demonstrates that the prescriptive is often interwoven into the descriptive.48  If everything 
has a specific purpose for which it is designed specifically, if the universe is inherently 
charged with and undergirded by Divine order and structure, then creation on a trajectory 
toward its telos entails an inherent moral standard written into the structure of the 
universe.49  Applying this insight to the example cited above, if cheating is not in accord 
with Maria's telos as a human being in a human society because it involves a) stealing 
from her fellow test-takers, b) lying to her future administrators and employers, and c) 
losing (at least temporarily) her fellowship with her Creator (which is the ultimate 
purpose of her existence), then the act of cheating can be seen to be objectively contrary 
to the law that is written in human nature. 
Hume’s criticism of Naturalism, as a primarily logical one seems to attack the 
lack of clarity in the writings of the Naturalist philosophers of his day.  The Is-Ought 
Problem as a logical critique of Naturalism, appears to criticize a very poor articulation of 
such a theory.50  At the very most, Hume’s criticism is merely a counter-assertion to the 
Naturalistic and Thomistic assertion that the universe is inherently eudaimonistic and 
teleological.  Moore’s naturalistic or Definist fallacy enlarges upon the debate that takes 
place in the discursive space that exists between these two assertions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, the Treatise On Law: [being Summa Theologiae, I-II; 
QQ. 90 through 97], trans. ed. R J. Henle, 63. 
   
49
 Janet Coleman, “MacIntyre and Aquinas” in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives On the 
Work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Edited by Horton, John, and Susan Mendus, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), 72. 
50
 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, 56. 
THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW                                                                                      19 
 
G.E. Moore’s Definist Fallacy 
 Moore’s attempt to do away with any naturalistic ethic, hinges on his argument 
that the “good” cannot be defined—at least in naturalistic terms.51  “Whatever definition 
be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether 
it is itself good.”52  As an intuitionist Moore denies any natural basis for the “good,” 
which is sui generis, simple, and unanalyzable.53   
Moore’s Definist problem, the naturalistic fallacy, arises in any attempt to answer 
the question “What is Good?” with a naturalistic answer.  Commentator Arthur N. Prior 
describes Moore’s Definist problem: 
[The naturalistic fallacy works under] the assumption that because 
some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily 
accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily 
accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is 
identical with goodness.  If, for example, it is believed that whatever is 
pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be 
pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this 
that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality.  The 
naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words 'good' and, 
say, 'pleasant' necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute 
the same quality to them.54 
                                                 
51
 D. F. Wright, “Diagnosing the Naturalistic Fallacy: Principia Ethica Revisited.” Southern 
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 Prior summarizes Moore’s Definist fallacy accurately.  This fallacy applies to the 
relationship between those things denoted as “good” and the definition of the “good” 
itself.55  According to Prior, Moore asserts that to commit the Definist fallacy is to 
assume that the good is at all definable.56  Though there is some continued debate over 
the definition and application of Moore’s articulation of the Definist fallacy, for present 
purposes Prior’s definition seems to convey a sufficiently accurate explanation. 
Moore’s argument begins with his suspicion that Utilitarianism (or any sort of 
Naturalistic ethic) depends on a logical error.  To this end he formulates the Open 
Question Argument.  This argument takes the form of modus tollens.  
(1) If chocolate is the good, then the question “Is chocolate good?” is 
meaningless. 
(2) The question “Is chocolate good?” is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open 
question). 
(3) Therefore, chocolate is not (analytically speaking) equivalent to good. 
Whereas: modus ponens 
(1) a. If John is a bachelor, then the question, “Is John married?” is meaningless. 
(2) a. John is a bachelor. 
(3) a. Therefore, the question, “Is John married?” is meaningless. 
(4) a. Therefore, “good” and “chocolate” do not have the same relationship that the 
terms “bachelor” and “married” do.57   
The Open Question Argument claims that any endeavor to define the term “good” 
using some set of empirical, natural properties always forms an open question.  Moore 
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illustrates a counter-example by citing the description of a horse which can be described 
and defined by its make-up of different natural properties (legs, tail, head, and hair).58  
Moore concludes that moral properties cannot be equated to, made up of, or described as 
parts of natural properties.   
Anthony Lisska, after analyzing Moore’s Definist fallacy, notes the different 
Natural Law theory criticisms of Moore and Hume.  He mentions two different Natural 
Law answers to the charge of the Definist fallacy.   John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and 
Germain Grisez formulate an almost Kantian Thomism, whereas Anthony Lisska, Ralph 
McInerny, Henry Veatch, and (to a less precise degree) Alasdair MacIntyre attempt to 
defend a more authentic or traditional Thomism. 
The New Natural Law Response 
 In many ways New Natural Law Theorists agree with the traditional Thomists in 
their interpretation of Thomistic Natural Law.  A discussion of the differences in 
interpretation and articulation of Thomistic Natural Law and the subsequent review of the 
different reactions prompted by varying contemporary criticisms rooted in the naturalistic 
fallacy help to illustrate the nuances in opinion among Natural Law theorists.  
Response to Hume 
 The New Natural Law theorists argue that Thomistic Natural Law cannot 
withstand the barrage of analytic criticism—at least in its traditionally understood form.  
John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle are the three most prominent New 
Natural Law theorists.59  Finnis, in particular, superimposes a quasi-Kantian concept of 
practical reason onto Thomistic Natural Law theory, insisting that basic human goods are 
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self-evident.60  Finnis attempts to restructure Natural Law in order to account efectively 
for two important concerns in the contemporary philosophical context.  These two issues 
are: Hume’s Is-Ought Problem, and the contemporary perspective on substance, or 
essence.61   
In fact, Finnis and Grisez have asserted in almost Kantian or Cartesian fashion 
that Natural Law theories must eschew invalid deductions (i.e. the Humean Is-Ought).  
They merely assert that traditional Thomism does fall prey to the Is-Ought Problem and 
they modify Natural Law theory accordingly.  “There can be no valid deduction of a 
normative conclusion without a normative principle, and thus … first practical principles 
cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations.”62  In other words, Finnis and Grisez 
see no way to maintain a traditional conception of ontology in Aquinas’s writings, which 
ties into Finnis’s second area of concern:  “a modern view of essence or substance.”63   
Self-Evidence 
The New Natural Law theorists insist that Thomism as interpreted by McInerny, 
Veatch, and others, assumes a definition of “essence” or “substance” that is medieval, 
and anachronistic.  That is, in its traditional sense, Thomistic Natural Law cannot 
withstand contemporary criticism, nor does it articulate in the appropriate analytic 
language, a conception of essence that at all coheres with Descartes’ project and further 
developments by Quine and Russell.64  Finnis subtly restructures Thomistic Natural Law 
so that self-evident, incommensurable principles take the place of Aquinas’s conception 
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of self-evidence (per se nota) and synderesis (“the law of our intellect insofar as it is a 
habitus containing the precepts of natural law which are the principles of human acts.”)65  
Finnis writes: 
Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural 
law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which can be 
adequately grasped by anyone at the age of reason (and not just by 
metaphysicians) are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable.  They 
are not inferred from speculative principles.  They are not inferred from 
facts.  They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human 
nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about the function of a 
human being, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of 
nature or any other conception of nature.  They are not inferred or derived 
from anything.66   
   The type of self-evident principles that Finnis refers to are different, albeit subtly, 
from the traditional Thomist understanding.  As already mentioned, Aquinas believed in 
an inherently rational structure by which man ascertains basic morality.  Per se nota, 
according to Aquinas, does not mean “self-evident” in the same way that Descartes, Kant, 
Russell, Quine, and ultimately, Finnis use that term.  Outside of the Treatise on Law, in 
the De Veritate (“On Truth”), Aquinas describes his conception of self-evidence as 
follows: 
Just as there is a certain natural habitus of the soul whereby it knows the 
principles of speculative science, which we call the understanding of the 
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principles, so too in the soul is there a certain natural habitus of the first 
principles of actions, which are the natural principles of natural law; and 
this habitus pertains to synderesis and exists in no other power than 
reason.67  
Thomistic self-evidence, then, cannot be interpreted properly in light of the 
typical, modern, rationalist understanding of self-evidence.  Aquinas would not define 
self-evidence in the narrow sense that modern philosophy, probably since Descartes, and 
certainly since Kant has been accustomed to do.  The Thomistic conception of self-
evidence distinguishes between two different understandings: “intrinsic self-evidence and 
self-evidence with regard to people.”68  Aquinas distinguishes between propositions 
which are known by all, and propositions which require diligent study or a requisite 
amount of wisdom: “Some propositions, however, are known only to the wise who 
understand the meaning of the term….it is self-evident [per se notum] that an angel is not 
circumscriptively in a place, but that is not manifest to the unlearned who cannot grasp 
it.”  Therefore, when Finnis and others attempt to interpret consistently per se nota as a 
specific kind of Cartesian or Kantian “self-evidence,” they are failing to take into account 
Aquinas’s looser use of per se nota. 
The Thomistic understanding of the inherent rational structure of the cosmos 
which leads to its eudaimonic and teleological ethic differs from the view of Finnis, 
Boyle, and Grisez.  The Kantian self-evident ethic that Finnis attempts to merge with 
Thomism ignores the natural basis on which Thomistic Natural Law theory hinges.  It 
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would seem that any Natural Law theory would, as Russell Hittinger suggests, “require a 
commitment to law as in some sense ‘natural,’ and nature as in some way normative.”69   
The New Natural Law Theory Is Incompatible 
New Natural Law Theory, in an effort to avoid the ostensible pitfall of the 
naturalistic fallacy (in all of its various manifestations), asserts that moral claims cannot 
be derived from “facts about human nature,” that moral claims can only derive from 
“premises that include still more fundamental reasons for action.”70  The New Natural 
Law theory abandons the central pursuit of Thomistic Natural Law theory—the 
reconciliation of the natural world with human reason—a reconciliation achieved by the 
apprehension of the inherent rational order of the cosmos. 
Finally, New Natural Law theorists are arguably incorrect in asserting that 
traditional Thomistic Natural Law theory has to be revised on the basis that it falls prey to 
the naturalistic fallacy.  Traditional Thomism does not allow for Finnis’s interpretation of 
self-evidence that he formulates specifically to avoid any criticism related to the Humean 
Is-Ought Problem.  In addition, the revisions undertaken by Finnis, Grisez, and others, 
although intriguing and perhaps enlightening in their own right, cannot pretend to 
demonstrate the authentic Thomistic Natural Law legacy.  
Conclusion: Traditional Thomism Requires No Revision 
 Traditional Thomists effectively counter the criticisms presented by both Hume’s 
Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Definist fallacy.  McInerny  delivers a rather scathing 
indictment of the Is-Ought criticism of naturalistic ethics.  He decries Hume’s assertion 
as an egregious case of missing the point, in that it wrongly assumes an artificial 
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disconnect between the “is” and the “ought.”71  This makes puzzling the New Natural 
Law theorists’ suggestion that the Is-Ought problem provides too strong a disincentive to 
traditional Natural Law theories.  Scholars like John Finnis insist that Thomistic Natural 
Law must, at the very least, undergo a re-articulation to achieve the respect of analytic 
philosophy.  Though this is an understandable position given the unfashionable and 
perhaps difficult metaphysical claims that Thomism relies on, citing the naturalistic 
fallacy as an ultima facie reason to do away with Thomistic Natural Law, traditionally 
understood, is untenable. 
The traditional Thomistic Natural Law legacy demonstrates that Thomistic 
Natural Law, traditionally and properly understood, has much to offer contemporary 
philosophy in its own right—independent of newer, similar theories.  Thomistic Natural 
Law requires only a proper interpretation to offer a valid message to analytic and 
contemporary philosophy.  Re-interpretations, like the New Natural Law theory, though 
legitimate and rich theories in their own right detract from the profundity, accessibility 
and expansive applicability of Thomistic Natural Law, authentically understood.  
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